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co-supported by the Dutch National e-Infrastructure coordinated by SURF, and by EGI Core Services

Assessing Combined Assurance

Introducing composites of DOGWOOD and BIRCH/CEDAR in EGI and beyond


EGI Combined Assurance use case

- IOTA AP assurance level 'DOGWOOD' is different, but remainder of the assurance can be taken up somebody else
 the user community or the registrar for the Access Platform
- Only thing you get is an opaque ID
- Stepping up to adequate assurance:
 - Real names from pseudonyms
 - Enrolling users in a community
 - Keeping audit records
 - Auditability and tracing
 - Incident response

Identity elements

- identifier management
- re-binding and revocation
- binding to entities
- traceability of entities
- emergency communications
- regular communications
- 'rich' attribute assertions
- correlating identifiers
- access control

The wLCG IOTA CA by-pass



Evolving the EGI Trust Fabric - Bari 2015

Project MinE (ALS) use case

- Access traditional global grid resources from the CLI
- By users that have no PKIX experience but are all properly vetted and registered (in the SURFsara CUA)
- Case comparable to LHC VOs (and to ELIXIR)
- Give access based on DOGWOOD CUA ID and prepopulate a VOMS server based on CUA details



Thanks to Mischa Sallé

INTERLUDE

A proxy from the TTS: the ad-hoc way

(i) https://rcdemo.nikhef.nl/getproxy/



AARC - one-time-password getproxy demo service

\bigcirc Plain grid proxy		get proxy
VOMS proxy (rcder	mo.aarc-project.eu)	
Lifetime in hours (optic	onal, default 12): 12	English Nederlands Español Français Deutsch
IdP entityID (optional, default: present WAYF):		
		eduGAIN Research and e-Infrastructures InCommon Czech Denmark Germany Greece Italy Netherlands Sweden Switzerland UK Other countries Miscellaneous
25 September 2017	Leveraging the	♥ Nikhef IGTF registration network for research

A one-time URL giving a shell script

🛈 🔒 https://rcdemo.nikhef.nl/getproxy/index.php?code=https%3A%2F%2Faai.egi.eu%2Fmp-oa2-server%2FauthzGrant%2F7d20a61e6a3a393c0c209f7a81706

You can now retrieve your proxy by running:

curl "https://rcdemo.nikhef.nl/getproxy/?hash=b45131f115e5c0c43a1c5f1c003ed28979d59d9a7d30f439a8b4741ec4ea5a77" | sh

NOTE:


4

- This link will expire in 10 minutes (at 21:04:56 UTC)
- You can use this link only once

return to client

client	🖻 bosui:/user/davidg (davidg:emin) — 🗆 🗙
	bosui(~) 22.55\$ curl "https://rcdemo.nikhef.nl/getproxy/?hash=b45131f115e5c0c43a1c5f1c003ed28 979d59d9a7d30f439a8b4741ec4ea5a77" sh
	% Total % Received % Xferd Average Speed Time Time Time Current
	Dload Upload Total Spent Left Speed 100 9572 0 9572 0 0 52108 0:::: 4673k
	Successfully stored a local copy of your proxy in /tmp/x509up_u5917 bosui(~) 22.55\$ voms-proxy-info head -10
	Picked up JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS: -Xmx512M
	subject : /DC=eu/DC=rcauth/DC=rcauth-clients/O=nikhef.nl/CN=David Groep QK-DHkZMTHoVTtT6/CN =1839098942/CN=1028921420
	issuer : /DC=eu/DC=rcauth/DC=rcauth-clients/O=nikhef.nl/CN=David Groep QK-DHkZMTHoVTtT6/CN =1839098942
	identity : /DC=eu/DC=rcauth/DC= <u>rcauth-clients/Q=nikhef.nl/CN</u> =David Groep OK-DHkZMTHoVTtT6
	type : RFC3820 compliant ir#!/bin/sh strength : 2048 : X509_USER_PROXY=/tmp/x509up_u\$(id -u)
	path : /tmp/x509up_u5917 timeleft : 11:58:59
	umask 0377 cat > \$X509_USER_PROXY << EOF
	MIINLjCCDBagAwIBAgIEFh/2SDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADCBnDESMBAGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWAmV1
	MRYWFAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYGcmNhdXROMR4wHAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYOcmNhdXRoLWNsaWVudHMx EjAQBgNVBAoMCW5pa2h1zi5ubDE1MCMGA1UEAwwcRGF2aWQgR3JvZXAgUUstREhrWk1USG9WVHRU
	NJETMBEGA1UEAXMKMTgZOTA5ODk0MjAeFw0xNzA5MjEyMDUYMjFaFw0xNzA5MjIwODU3MjFaMIGw MRTwFAYKCZTmiZPVLGORGRYCZXUYFiAURdolkialk/TsZAFZFdZvY2F1dGdyHiAcRdolkialk/Ts

Register your ssh public key – like in gitlab, sourceforge, &c



25 September 2017

msalle@nikhef.nl

Sallé,

additional info: Mischa

Hiding PKIX – just like KRB

- Implicit retrieval of proxies using ssh-agent
- Resulting proxies can decorated with VOMS without need for passphrases or other credentials

```
Bosui:/user/davidg (davidg:emin)
Using username "davidg"
Authenticating with public key "davidg-ikonet.nikhef.nl [2048 bit RSA]" from age
nt
Last login: Thu Sep 21 22:46:10 2017 from 2a07:8500:120:e03b::1000
≓bosui(~) 22.47$ ssh proxy@ssh.aai.egi.eu > /tmp/x509up_u$(id -u) && chmod 0400 /tmp/x509up_u$(id -u)
PTY allocation request failed on channel 0
Connection to ssh.aai.egi.eu closed.
_bosui(~) 22.47$ grid-proxy-info
csubject : /DC=eu/DC=rcauth/DC=rcauth-clients/O=nikhef.nl/CN=David Groep QK-DHkZMTHoVTtT6/CN=1839098942/CN=267447935
          : /DC=eu/DC=rcauth/DC=rcauth-clients/O=nikhef.nl/CN=David Groep OK-DHkZMTHoVTtT6/CN=1839098942
issuer
identity : /DC=eu/DC=rcauth/DC=rcauth-clients/O=nikhef.nl/CN=David Groep QK-DHkZMTHoVTtT6
          : RFC 3820 compliant impersonation proxy
type
strength : 2048 bits
          : /tmp/x509up_u5917
path
timeleft : 11:59:48
```

Interest : 11:59:2 Interest : 11:59:2 Interest : 11:59:2 Interest : 22.47\$ Interest : 11:59:2 Interest : 22.47\$ Interest : 11:59:2 Interest : 11:59:2 Interest : 20:2 Interest : 11:59:2 Interest : 20:2 Interes Predictable RCauth subject naming (USR) allows pre-registering in VOMS, COmanage, &c 25 September 2017

Beyond DOGWOOD (CERN IOTA, RCauth, CILogon Basic)

- Old model: CERN STS tight VO binding model
 - With the EGI and WLCG specific exception
- EGI combined assurance model
 - Make assurance combination part of service AuthZ
 - Implemented by major AuthZ frameworks: Argus (1.7.1+), LCMAPS, dCache (3.1+)
 - Configuration shipped via EGI and WLCG
- But: which 'other' assurance providers qualify?


Specific Delegated Responsibilities

Need for proper traceability does not go away, so ...


- who holds that information need not only be a traditional CA
- but can be another entity with similarly rigorous processes

Some communities have an existing registration system that is very robust


- PRACE in-person links at the home sites
- XSEDE NSF grant approval process
- and HR Database



Distributed Responsibilities I: Trusted Third Party



Distributed Responsibilities II: Collaborative Assurance & Traceability



IOTA in the EGI context

EGI – by design - supports loose and flexible user collaboration

- 300+ communities
- Many established 'bottom-up' with fairly light-weight processes
- Membership management policy* is deliberately light-weight
- Most VO managers rely on naming in credentials to enroll colleagues

Only a few VOs are 'special'

- LHC VOs: enrolment is based on the users' entry in a special (CERNmanaged) HR database, based on a separate face-to-face vetting process and eligibility checks, including government photo ID + institutional attestations
- Only properly registered and active people can be listed in VOMS

Developing an assessment framework

SPG:Drafts:Assessment Community IDvetting adequacy

Authentication and identification is considered adequate, for each User authorised to access Services, if the combined assurance level provided by the end-user credential issuing authority, and either the e-Infrastructure registration service and/or the VO registration service, meets or exceeds the requirements of the approved IGTF authentication assurance profiles [AAP].

The Community or e-Infrastructure wishing to prove the adequacy of its identity vetting, in order to use its members' credentials in conjunction with the IGTF Assurance Profile DOGWOOD, must submit a request for assessment by the EGI Security Policy Group to EGI operations.

The request shall include the following information:

- a statement of their compliance with the Community Membership Management Policy
- a statement of their compliance with the Community Operations Security Policy
- a documented description of the membership life cycle process and practices meeting the requirements of the IGTF BIRCH, CEDAR (or ASPEN) assurance level a, in which
 - the credential of the user is the membership registration data and community-issued assertions
 - the Issuing Authority is the collection of membership management and assertion-issuing systems and services
 - the credential life time corresponds to the renewal periods as defined in the Community Membership Management Policy
- a description of the method of binding between the membership information and the DOGWOOD user credential

Based on this information, the EGI SPG shall advise the EGI Operations Management Board with respect to suitability of the Community or e-Infrastructure for such combined adequacy in accordance with the Policy on Acceptable Authentication Assurance.

The SPG may make available an evaluation matrix . Applicant communities are welcome to use the assurance evaluation matrix to prepare the requisite documents, bearing in mind the evaluation *Method* and the *Persistent registry (community membership) implementation and assessment hints*. The most relevant community assurance profiles for the joint adequacy purpose are BIRCH and CEDAR. Registries and membership services at ASPEN level are strongly discouraged. The credential (registration) life time of 11 days necessitates re-registering members with this frequency, and re-validating their eligibility. This model is likely to both confuse and upset members.

The need for guidance



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IGTF Levels of Authentication Assurance


Version 1.1-2016

Abstract

The Interoperable Global Trust Federation (IGTF) is a body to establish common policies and guidelines that help establish interoperable, global trust relations between providers of e-Infrastructures and cyber-infrastructures, identity providers, and other qualified relying parties. The IGTF Levels of Authentication Assurance (LoA) generalization process aims to extract those elements from 'Authentication Profiles' the IGTF has developed that are of general value to the community. The LoAs described in this document represent the consensus on acceptable levels for

Assessment Matrix

- Mapping for PKIX/RFC3647 is trivial
- How to apply out BIRCH/CEDAR guidance to community registries?





Discussion!

BUILDING A GLOBAL TRUST FABRIC