

GN4-3 - T&I - eScience Global Engagement Maarten Kremers, SURF

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EUGridPMA #52 / GN4-3 T&I EnCo / AARC Policy community Virtual 26TH January 2022



Operate T&I services

GN 4-3 T&I Objectives



Develop and Enhance the T&I services

Explore new or disruptive ideas

Expand the Reach of Federated Access



Engage with the relevant stakeholders

eduroam

Paul Dekkers (SURF)



Contraction Contraction Contraction Contraction Cont

T&I Services

Christos Kanellopoulos (GÉANT)

> Michelle Williams (In Academia (GÉANT)







Enabling Communities







T&I Business Development Coordination



Facilitating of the AEGIS group



T&I eScience Global Engagement



AEGIS



The AARC Engagement Group for Infrastructures (AEGIS) brings together global representatives from AAI operators in research infrastructures and e-infrastructures, which are implementing authentication and authorisation services that support federated access, to discuss adoption of policy and technical best practices that facilitate interoperability across e-infrastructures ands einfrastructures.





The 'eScience Global Engagement' of EnCo in the GEANT project is there to support those developments in the policy and best practice areas that would benefit the community at large, and do that by means of supporting the work in the existing forums such as WISE, FIM4R, IGTF, REFEDS, AARCcommunity, and the research and e-Infra communities directly





To manage risks related to the access control of their services, the Relying Parties of the research and education federations need to make decisions on how much to trust the assertions made by the Identity Providers and their back-end Credential Service Providers. This document introduces the REFEDS Assurance Framework for assurance and its expression using common identity federation protocols. Image risks related to the access control of their services, the Relying Parties of the research and education federations need to make decisions on how much to trust the assertions made by the Identity Providers and their back-end Credential Service Providers. This document introduces the REFEDS Assurance Framework for assurance and its expression using common identity federation protocols. Image risks related to the access control of their services, the Relying Parties of the research and education federations need to make decisions on how much to trust the assertions in common identity federation protocols. Image risks related to the access control of their services, the Relying Parties of the research and education federations need to make decisions on how much to trust the assertions in common identity federation protocols. Image risks related to the access control of their services, the Relying Parties of the research and education federations need to make decisions on how much to trust the assertion protocols. Image risks related to the access control of their services, the Relying Parties of the research and education federation protocols. Image risks related to the access control of their services, the research and education federation protocols. Image risks related to the Relevent to	REFEDS Assura				EDS > REFEDS Assurance Framev	Full paper Published
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SCI

Security for Collaborating Infrastructures Trust

Framework

Introduction

Research and e-Infrastructures recognise that controlling information security is crucial for providing continuous and trustworthy services for the communities. The Security for Collaborating Infrastructures (SCI) working group is a collaborative activity within the Wise Information Security for e-Infrastructures (WISE) trust community. The aim of the SCI trust framework is to enable interoperation of collaborating Infrastructures in managing cross-infrastructure operational security risks. It also builds trust between Infrastructures by adopting policy standards for collaboration especially in cases where identical security policy documents cannot be shared. Governing principles of the SCI framework are incident containment, ascertaining the causes of incidents, identifying affected parties, addressing data protection and risk management and understanding measures required to prevent an incident from reoccurring. The original SCI version 1 Framework was produced in 2013.


The SCI Working Group has produced a second version of the framework, to reflect changes in technology, culture and to improve its relevance to a broad range of infrastructures.

Access the SCI version 2 Framework here











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is one



Top Level Infrastructure Policy Template

Questions to ask yourself when defining the policy:

- Who are the actors in your Infrastructure environment?
- How will you tie additional policies together for the infrastructure?
- Which bodies should approve policy wording?

This policy is effective from <insert date>.

INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

To fulfil its mission, it is necessary for the Infrastructure to protect its assets. This document presents the policy regulating those activities of participants related to the security of the Infrastructure.

Definitions

Infrastructure All of the IT hardware, software, networks, data, facilities, processes and any other elements that together are required to develop, test, deliver, monitor, control or support services.

Service An infrastructure component fulfilling a need of the users, such as computing, storage, networking or software systems





GÉANT

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Interoperable Global Trust Federation AP EU TAG	Work in Progress
Guidelines for Secure Operation of Attribute Authorities and other issuers of access-	On the agenda
granting statements	

WISE Community: Security Communication Challenges Coordination WG (SCCC-WG)

Introduction and background

Maintaining trust between different infrastructures and domains depends largely on predictable responses by all parties involved. Many frameworks – e.g. SCI and Sirtfi – and groups such as the coordinated e-Infrastructures, the IGTF, and REFEDS, all promote mechanisms to publish security contact information, and have either explicit or implicit expectations on their remit, responsiveness, and level of confidentiality maintained. However, it is a well-recognised fact that data that is not

Dashboard / ... / SCCC-JWG 🏻 🔓

Communications Challenge planning

Created by David Groep, last modified by Maarten Kremers on Jan 22, 2020

Body	Last challenge	Campaign name	Next challenge	Campaign name	Status
IGTF	October 2019			IGTF-RATCC4-2019	Completed
EGI	March 2019	SSC 19.03 (8)			(Completed
Trusted Introducer	August 2019	TI Reaction Test	January 2019	TI Reaction Test	Repeats three times a year

Campaign information

Campaigns can target different constituencies and may overlap. The description of the constituency given here should be sufficient for a hun it need not be a detailed description or a list of addresses (which would be a privacy concern since this page is public). Challenges can also a contact address does not bounce, to testing if the organisation contacted can do system memory forensic analysis and engage effectively

- ability to receive mail does not bounce or phone rings
- automated answering ticket system receipt or answering machine
- human responding a human (helpdesk operative) answers trivially (e.g. name)
- human familiar with subject-matter responding responsible person responds
- service analysis capability a responsible person or team can investigate and resolve common incidents reported to the contact addre

See also https://www.eugridpma.org/agenda/47/contribution/6/material/slides/0.pptx for some background.

Please do not post sensitive data to this Wiki - it is publicly viewable for now.



GEAI





T&I Outreach





AARC

AA: OIDC

AA: SANL

Attribute Authorities

End Services:

•

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ARC Blueprint Architecture

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should I handle credential delegation and

impersonation? AARC-G

from the proxy? AARC-G

users to use? AARC-G04

My service needs to act on behalf of the user - how

How should Services hint which IdP they would like

Which Security practices should I follow? AARC-G014

My services are not web based, how can I use identities

- How should I approach performing a Data Protection Impact Assessment? AARC-G042 .
- How should my infrastructure support Federated Security Incident Response? AARC-1051 .



- Which best practices should I follow for my Token Translation Services? AARC-G004
- How should I translate from Identity Federation information to X.509 certificates? AARC-G010
- Proxies:



- How can I ensure that my proxy is able to • accurately claim that it supports best practices in Identity Federation? AA
- How should I express assurance information for users when interacting with another proxy?

Community Attribute Services:

- How should attributes from multiple sources be . aggregated? AARC-G003
- How should I express the home institute of a user?
- What are the best practices for running my Attribute Authorities securely? AARC-
- Which Acceptable Use Policy should I use to facilitate interoperability? AARC-I



- How should I integrate Social Media Identity Providers? AA
- How should users link accounts, and how does that affect Assurance? AARC-G009 How should services indicate that they would like
- users to authenticate with multifactor authentication, and how should my proxy forward that information? AARC-G029

Assurance:

- . How should assurance information of external identities be calculated? AARC-G03
- What can I say about assurance of identities from social media accounts? AARC-G041
- How is assurance impacted by account linking?
- How should assurance information be shared with other infrastructures? AARC-G021
- Which Assurance Profiles should I use, there are so many! AARC-1050

Authorisation

- How should I manage authorisation information from multiple sources? AARC-G006
- How should group and role information be expressed to facilitate interoperability?
- How should resource capabilities be expressed? AARC-G027

What next? Are you looking for a kick start with vour policies? Take a look at the Policy Development Toolkit which provides a set of templates.

Certain guidelines are being adopted by the AEGIS community to support interoperability between infrastructures - consider prioritising these best practices.











AARC



GN4-3 Project Updates

EnCo Policy TNC22 Abstract got accepted!



GN5-1 preparations



Relevant meetings • TNC22 13^{th –} 16th June (Trieste, Italy)

REFEDS
 TBD

• WISE & SIG ISM: Spring 2022 (date still to be defined)



GN4-3 Project Updates

- Review our own workplan
- Activities that need or more less attention
 - New Activities
 - Activities to dropped

https://edu.nl/ctxxg

