




### **EOSC Future Security Operations and Policy**

June 2021 EUGridPMA IGTF meeting









Finities of all kinds

— diversity in the EOSC range from data sets to storage to computing to publications & digital objects

An open ecosystem — rules of participation will favour low barrier to entry regarding operational maturity, service management quality, &c

A diverse ecosystem — providers will come from e-Infrastructures, from member states, from research infrastructures, and private sector


An *interdependent* ecosystem — aiming for composability and collective service design through an open, core AAI federation

**EOSC Interoperability Framework** 



### Mission of EOSC Future ...








#### Components Integrated by EOSC Future





EUGridPMA52 - June 2021



## Start with the basics for 'EOSC at large'



From promoting and monitoring provider specific capabilities to managing core risk

A service provider should

- do no harm to interests & assets of users
- not expose other service providers
   in the EOSC ecosystem to enlarged risk
   as a result of their participation in EOSC
- **be transparent** about its infosec maturity and risk to its customers and suppliers

this means some minimum requirements in the Rules of Participation and a response capability in the core that protects ecosystem integrity



## **EOSC Security Operations & Policy**



#### Risk-centric self-assessment framework

based on federated InfoSec guidance including WISE SCI

#### Baselining security policies & common assurance

• AARC, REFEDS, IGTF, PDK & practical implementation measures

#### An incident coordination hub and a trust posture

spanning providers and core, based on experience & exercises

#### Actionable operational response to incidents

• EOSC core expertise to support resolution of cross-provider issues

#### Fostering trust through a known skills programme

DanielK - WP10 →

• so that your peers may have confidence in service provider abilities




## The EOSC AAI /Federation

In order to outline a globally viable, scalable and secure EOSC AAI, the group defined the following three core principles, on which to base their work:

- **User experience** is the only touchstone.
- All trust flows from communities.
- There is no centre in a distributed system.

"The human element was the starting point of our exploration. We believe that providing a good user experience and making use of the existing trust relations that users already have within their research communities are the key factors for delivering a successful EOSC AAI." [Klaas Wieringa, EOSC AAI TF chair]

doi:10.2777/8702 - ISBN 978-92-76-28113-9





#### Why is the EOSC AAI important here?



#### ... the new 'EOSC' federation gets policies and a base line at 'onboarding' time

Membership of the EOSC AAI Federation MUST be requested to the Federation Operator by each prospective member. In this request, the applicant MUST:

- declare its intent to join the EOSC AAI Federation;
- · declare its participation in the EOSC and adherence to its Rules of Participation;
- commit to adherence to the pertinent technical requirements of the EOSC AAI Interoperability Framework (technical baseline);
- · commit to adherence to the security policy baseline of EOSC security operations;
- provide contact information for administrative, technical, and security matters, each of which Registered Representatives SHALL have least two contact entry points;

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- leveraging existing trust frameworks
- not repeat earlier mistakes: so implement a baseline at the start





#### Planning security activities for the EOSC



- 1. Information security **risk assessment framework** based on SCI and a maturity model targeting connected services as well as data, and correlated risks
- Coordinate security policies for a baseline aligned with the Rules of Participation of the EOSC, and the EOSC AAI federation – ensuring transparency for the 'risk appetite' of the participants
- 3. Mechanisms for **coordination** and resolution of incidents through Information Security Management (ISM) processes leveraging WISE community and Sirtfi, and enabling the (tested) framework for information sharing
- 4. Security **operations and incident response capabilities** related to or affecting the EOSC Core (in relatively broad sense) with content and service providers



### Risk Assessment



- base on WISE Risk Assessment for WISE (RAW-WG) assessment template
- moves beyond single-domain framework
- specifically challenging if you cannot enumerate your assets?
- EOSC-specialised maturity model and (self-)assessments
- assessment of risk of combined and composite services





## Security policy baseline and trust



- needs to preserve the risk appetite of the participants involved
- trust should be transparent, comparably formulated, and address existing and emergent usage patterns
- taking in EOSC Rules of Participation WG, governance activities, and WISE
- 1. security policy baseline to be incorporated into EOSC AAI Federation participation policy and incorporate secure service operations guidelines
- evolving trust 'mapping' framework of WISE SCI by explicitly incorporating federative aspects
- 3. effective peer-reviewed self-assessment of information security maturity





# Coordination framework and operational sharing process



- incidents are not limited to just one participant, so their mitigation, containment, and ultimate resolution requires a collective response
- leverage, enhance mechanisms developed in WISE and REFEDS
- procedures for collaborating and sharing of the so-called 'Indicators of Compromise' (IoCs)
- since incidents do not stop at the EOSC edge, needs engagement with whole constituency: EOSC Core, Exchange, providers, community
- concrete processes that enable collaboration during actual response
- periodically exercised!





## Remediation of Core incidents and coordinated security response



- interdependency of services requires exchange of information and a coherent and simultaneous response to incidents both across services as well as inside each individual service
- coordinating response for incidents affecting the EOSC
- remediation of incidents in the Portal, Core Services, and key infrastructure elements

effective remediation of incidents in the EOSC at large *also* depends on subsidiarity and participation of service providers and Infra's







## 'whatever it will become, EOSC will shape the research area – and its resilience and security'

Nikhef

David Groep

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