

# **GN4-3 - T&I - eScience Global Engagement**

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Virtual Meeting
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# **Operate T&I services**





**Develop and Enhance the T&I services** 



**Explore new or disruptive ideas** 

Expand the Reach of Federated Access



**Engage with the relevant stakeholders** 




Incubator

**T&I Services** 

Enabling Communities

Identity r/e-infras EOSC EOSC AARC

**Operational Support** 





# **Enabling Communities**

# Trust & Identity Outreach





**T&I Business Development Coordination** 



Facilitating of the AEGIS group



T&I eScience Global Engagement



# **AEGIS**



The AARC Engagement Group for Infrastructures (AEGIS) brings together global representatives from AAI operators in research infrastructures and e-infrastructures, which are implementing authentication and authorisation services that support federated access, to discuss adoption of policy and technical best practices that facilitate interoperability across e-infrastructures ands e-infrastructures.





The 'eScience Global Engagement' of EnCo in the GEANT project is there to support those developments in the policy and best practice areas that would benefit the community at large, and do that by means of supporting the work in the existing forums such as WISE, FIM4R, IGTF, REFEDS, AARC-community, and the research and e-Infra communities directly




















### SCI

# **Security for Collaborating Infrastructures Trust Framework**

### Introduction

Research and e-Infrastructures recognise that controlling information security is crucial for providing continuous and trustworthy services for the communities. The Security for Collaborating Infrastructures (SCI) working group is a collaborative activity within the Wise Information Security for e-Infrastructures (WISE) trust community. The aim of the SCI trust framework is to enable interoperation of collaborating Infrastructures in managing cross-infrastructure operational security risks. It also builds trust between Infrastructures by adopting policy standards for collaboration especially in cases where identical security policy documents cannot be shared. Governing principles of the SCI framework are incident containment, ascertaining the causes of incidents, identifying affected parties, addressing data protection and risk management and understanding measures required to prevent an incident from reoccurring. The original SCI version 1 Framework was produced in 2013.

The SCI Working Group has produced a second version of the framework, to reflect changes in technology, culture and to improve its relevance to a broad range of infrastructures.


Access the SCI version 2 Framework here



















### Top Level Infrastructure Policy Template

Questions to ask yourself when defining the policy:

- Who are the actors in your Infrastructure environment?
- How will you tie additional policies together for the infrastructure?
- Which bodies should approve policy wording?

This policy is effective from <insert date>.

### INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS

To fulfil its mission, it is necessary for the Infrastructure to protect its assets. This document presents the policy regulating those activities of participants related to the security of the Infrastructure.

### Definitions

Infrastructure All of the IT hardware, software, networks, data, facilities, processes and any other elements that together are required to develop, test, deliver, monitor, control or support services.

Service An infrastructure component fulfilling a need of the users, such as computing, storage, networking or software systems.











Guidelines for Secure Operation of Attribute Authorities and other issuers of accessgranting statements





## WISE Community: Security Communication Challenges Coordination WG (SCCC-WG)

### Introduction and background

Maintaining trust between different infrastructures and domains depends largely on predictable responses by all parties involved. Many frameworks – e.g. SCI and Sirtfi – and groups such as the coordinated e-Infrastructures, the IGTF, and REFEDS, all promote mechanisms to publish security contact information, and have either explicit or implicit expectations on their remit, responsiveness, and level of confidentiality maintained. However, it is a well-recognised fact that data that is not

### Dashboard /... / SCCC-JWG 🚡

### Communications Challenge planning

Created by David Groep, last modified by Maarten Kremers on Jan 22, 2020

Body	Last challenge	Campaign name	Next challenge	Campaign name	Status
IGTF	October 2019			IGTF-RATCC4-2019	Completed
EGI	March 2019	SSC 19.03 (8)			(Completed
Trusted Introducer	August 2019	TI Reaction Test	January 2019	TI Reaction Test	Repeats three times a year

### Campaign information

Campaigns can target different constituencies and may overlap. The description of the constituency given here should be sufficient for a hur it need not be a detailed description or a list of addresses (which would be a privacy concern since this page is public). Challenges can also a contact address does not bounce, to testing if the organisation contacted can do system memory forensic analysis and engage effectively

- · ability to receive mail does not bounce or phone rings
- · automated answering ticket system receipt or answering machine
- human responding a human (helpdesk operative) answers trivially (e.g. name)
- human familiar with subject-matter responding responsible person responds
- service analysis capability a responsible person or team can investigate and resolve common incidents reported to the contact addre

See also https://www.eugridpma.org/agenda/47/contribution/6/material/slides/0.pptx for some background.

Please do not post sensitive data to this Wiki - it is publicly viewable for now.





















# T&I Outreach





Webinars?

Infosheets?









# Thank you Any questions?

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